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David J. Burman *
In 1987, amid rumors that an entity controlled by T. Boone
Pickens was acquiring stock of The Boeing Company and
might seek control of the company, the Washington Legisla-
ture enacted a law designed to limit the hostile takeover of
large corporations with substantial economic ties to the state
("the Washington Act" or "the Act").' The Act is a type of
third generation antitakeover statute2 known as a moratorium
statute.' Unlike those antitakeover statutes that make all hos-
tile takeovers less attractive by making either the total cost or
the acquisition of control uncertain,4 the Act temporarily
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1. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.50.010 (1987).
2. Recent state antitakeover statutes are referred to in generational terms because
most were drafted in response to Supreme Court decisions as to the constitutionality of
various forms of state regulation in this area. The so-called first generation statutes,
which attempted to supplement the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), 78n(d)-(f),
by directly regulating tender offers, pre-date the Supreme Court's invalidation of
Illinois' first generation statute in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). The so-
called second generation statutes were enacted in response to the MITE decision, and
only indirectly regulate hostile corporate takeovers. The Court upheld Indiana's
second generation statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
The third generation statutes, which were enacted after the CTS decision, also regulate
hostile takeovers only indirectly.
3. Washington also has enacted a fair price antitakeover statute, see infra note 4,
the constitutionality of which is not addressed in this article. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1988).
4. A state can discourage all hostile takeovers of the corporations subject to its
antitakeover provisions by a variety of forms of indirect regulation that make the
potential acquisition less attractive. For example, fair price statutes require
supermajority approval under certain circumstances of the merger of the target
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restricts an acquiror's ability to mortgage or break up the
acquired company for short term gain or to finance the acquisi-
tion debt.
Although the United States Supreme Court in 1987 upheld
the constitutionality of Indiana's control share statute,5 the
constitutionality of the Washington Act has been questioned.
The constitutional uncertainty results primarily from the Act's
extraterritorial reach. Unlike the Indiana statute and most of
the moratorium statutes enacted in other states, 6 the Washing-
ton Act prohibits transactions between some foreign corpora-
tions and their shareholders.7
This Article addresses the constitutionality of the Wash-
ington Act under the Commerce8 and Supremacy Clauses9 of
the United States Constitution, 10 and concludes that despite its
extension to a limited group of foreign corporations, the Act is
indeed constitutional under both clauses.
corporation and an interested shareholder. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.425
(1987); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985). Similarly, some
control share acquisition statutes condition the attachment of voting rights to a
potential acquiror's shares on the approval of a majority of the disinterested
shareholders. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (Burns Supp. 1988).
5. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
6. At the present time, at least ten states in addition to Washington have
moratorium statutes, only one of which, Kentucky's, applies to foreign corporations.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1132 (1988); IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-43-18 (Burns Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271B.12-200 to -230
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10A-1 to -6 (West Supp. 1989); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 912
(McKinney Supp. 1989); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2551-2556 (1988); WiS. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.726 (West Supp. 1988).
7. Indeed, it is only because of the Act's extraterritorial scope that The Boeing
Company, a Delaware corporation, is subject to its terms.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
10. We do not address the Act's constitutionality under the Takings Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 10, and Contract Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, because in our view
these clauses pose no serious threat to the Act. A Takings Clause challenge would
most likely fail even if one assumes arguendo that the Act decreases the value of a
target corporation's shares. The diminution of a property's market value as a
consequence of the valid exercise of the police power does not constitute taking. E.g.,
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944); Carruth v. United States, 627 F.2d 1068,
1081 (Ct. Cl. 1980). With respect to the Contract Clause, we note only that even those
who argue that state antitakeover statutes violate the Contract Clause concede that
under the existing case law intra-corporate relations are not treated as a series of
private contracts. See Butler & Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the
Contract Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 611 (1988). Absent the threshold contract
requirement, we need not reach the issue of whether the Washington Act in fact
impairs obligations of any sort, contractual or otherwise.
Washington's Antitakeover Act
I. THE TERMS OF THE WASHINGTON ACT
The Washington Act prohibits a target corporation subject
to the Act's terms from engaging in "significant business trans-
actions" with an "acquiring person" within five years of a
shareholder's becoming such an "acquiring person" unless the
transaction or the acquisition is approved in advance by a
majority of the target corporation's board of directors." The
Act defines "acquiring person" as "a person or group of per-
sons, other than the target corporation or a subsidiary of the
target corporation, who beneficially owns ten percent or more
of the outstanding voting shares of the target corporation.' 12
"Significant business transaction" is defined to include: the
merger or consolidation of the target or any subsidiary with
the acquiring person or its affiliates; the disposition or encum-
brance of more than five percent of the target corporation's
assets, outstanding shares, earning power or net income; the
termination of five percent or more of the target corporation's
Washington employees; the issuance, transfer or redemption
by the target corporation of shares, options, warrants, or rights
to acquire shares of the target to the acquiring person on a
non-pro rata basis (excluding involuntary redemptions); the
adoption of a plan for the disposition of assets or the dissolu-
tion of the target proposed by or pursuant to an understanding
with the acquiring person; the reclassification of securities to
increase the proportionate share of the outstanding shares of a
particular class of voting shares owned by the acquiring per-
son; and the grant of nonproportional financial assistance to
the acquiring person."
Corporations defined as "target corporations" under the
Act include domestic corporations with principal executive
offices in Washington if either a majority of their employees
(including the employees of their subsidiaries) are Washington
residents or they and any of their subsidiaries employ more
than one thousand state residents.14 Foreign corporations
doing business in Washington that have their principal execu-
tive offices in the state are also defined as target corporations
if: 1) more than ten percent of their shareholders of record are
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.50.040 (1987). Although the Act was passed in 1987, it
was amended in 1988. References are to the codified version of the Act as amended.
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.50.020(1) (Supp. 1988).
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.50.020(9) (Supp. 1988).
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.50.020(13)(a) (Supp. 1988).
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Washington residents, more than ten percent of their shares
are owned by Washington residents, or one thousand or more
of the shareholders of record reside in Washington; 2) a major-
ity of their employees are Washington residents or they
employ more than one thousand Washington residents; and 3)
a majority of their tangible assets are located in Washington or
they have more than fifty million dollars worth of tangible
assets located in Washington.1" All three factors must be pres-
ent, which effectively limits the Act's coverage to domestic cor-
porations based in Washington and a very few foreign
corporations with a substantial Washington presence.
In enacting this legislation, the Washington Legislature
found that hostile or unfriendly attempts to gain control of
publicly held corporations can cause corporate management to
dissipate a corporation's assets and energies to the detriment of
the long-term interests of the shareholders and the economic
health of the state.16 It stated that the Act's purpose is
to balance the substantial and legitimate interests of the
state in corporations that employ a large number of citizens
of the state and that have a substantial economic base in the
state with: The interests of citizens of other states who own
shares of such corporations; the interests of the state of
incorporation of such corporations in regulating the internal
affairs of corporations incorporated in that state; and the
interests of promoting interstate commerce.
17
II. THE WASHINGTON ACT'S CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
As with any state regulation affecting interstate economic
activity, the Act's validity under the federal Constitution's
Commerce Clause must be assessed. Under any of the several
measures of the effect of state regulation on interstate com-
merce, and more particularly under the Supreme Court's
recent Commerce Clause analysis of Indiana's antitakeover
statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,'
8 the Act
is constitutional.
Virtually from its inception, the Commerce Clause has
been understood to prohibit unduly burdensome state action
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.50.020(13)(b) (Supp. 1988).
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.50.010(4) (Supp. 1988).
17. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.50.010(7) (Supp. 1988).
18. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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even in the absence of direct federal regulation of a commer-
cial activity.19 How much state regulation is permissible, and
how the burden on interstate commerce should be evaluated,
have proven to be intractable problems under this so-called
"dormant" Commerce Clause.2 ° Regardless of which of the
Supreme Court's competing analyses are applied, two general
principles must be considered in evaluating state laws under
the dormant Commerce Clause. First, one must determine
whether the state law discriminates against nonresidents in
favor of residents of the regulating state.2' Where legislation
affects both residents and nonresidents, a political check exists
which is absent when legislation is discriminatory.22 Conse-
quently, regardless of the analysis used, nondiscriminatory leg-
islation is more likely to be upheld.23 Second, even if the
legislation is nondiscriminatory, one must measure the extent
of the burden on interstate commerce.24 This second step has
taken a number of forms in the Supreme Court's Commerce
Clause decisions25 including inquiries into whether the state
law poses a substantial risk of inconsistent regulation,26
whether the burden placed upon interstate commerce is direct
19. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The question of the
effect of direct federal regulation is considered in Section III, infra.
20. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 6-14, at 439-41 (2d ed. 1988).
21. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
22. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984)
("Unrepresented interests will often bear the brunt of regulations imposed by one
State having a significant effect on persons or operations in other States. Thus, 'whenthe regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those
without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political
restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some
interests within the state.'" (quoting South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros.,
Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938))); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938).
23. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 676 (1981)
(plurality); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177,
187 (1938). See also 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK, & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.4, at 586 (1986) (stating that the Supreme Court "hasconsistently evinced a greater willingness to sustain state regulations which equally'
burden local residents").
24. Some inquiry beyond that for discrimination against out-of-state interests is
necessary because of the myriad ways in which neutral state legislation could unduly
hinder the functioning of interstate markets. Even Justice Scalia, whose dormant
Commerce Clause analysis provides for a relatively limited judicial inquiry, looks
beyond discrimination to determine the risk of multiple inconsistent regulations by the
states. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94-95 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment).
25. See id. at 87.
26. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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or indirect,27 and whether the parochial interest furthered by
the state law outweighs the burden on interstate commerce.28
Regardless of its specific form, some version of this quantifying
step occurs in virtually all of the Court's dormant Commerce
Clause analyses.
We therefore first apply a discrimination analysis to the
Washington Act and then apply the two more frequently used
measures of the extent of a state law's burden on interstate
commerce. We conclude our Commerce Clause discussion by
addressing briefly the Act's consistency with the Clause's
underlying non-protectionist goals.
A. The Discrimination Analysis
1. The Definition of Discrimination Under the
Commerce Clause
Despite the frequent use of discrimination analyses in the
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the contours of the discrimi-
nation inquiry are unclear. 29 Although the Washington Act by
its terms treats both residents and nonresidents of the state
identically, this renders the Act nondiscriminatory for Com-
merce Clause purposes only if facial neutrality is sufficient.3"
Facially neutral state laws do not necessarily pass constitu-
tional muster under the Supreme Court's equal protection
analysis3 ' if the application of the law is discriminatory.2
Unless their respective functions justify the application of dif-
ferent standards as to what constitutes discrimination, facial
27. Primarily a nineteenth century mode of Commerce Clause analysis, see, e.g.,
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888), the direct versus indirect distinction was
used as recently as 1982 in Justice White's plurality opinion in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 641-43 (1982); see also Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, 865 F.2d 99, 101
(6th Cir. 1989) (relying in part on MITE's indirect burden analysis in concluding that
Tennessee's antitakeover provisions violate the Commerce Clause).
28. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
29. See Regan, Siamese Essays, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1864, 1869 (1987) (noting that
neither the CTS majority nor Justice Scalia's concurrence define discrimination for
Commerce Clause purposes).
30. Some courts have concluded that such facial neutrality is sufficient for
Commerce Clause purposes. See, e.g., Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 138
Cal. App. 3d 216, 225, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 858-59 (1982) (finding a corporate governance
regulation nondiscriminatory because "it applies to covered foreign corporations the
same rules which are applied to corporations domiciled within the state").
31. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (fifth
amendment's due process protection contains an equal protection component).
32. Eg., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373-374 (1886).
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neutrality can no more be sufficient for Commerce Clause pur-
poses than it is for Equal Protection purposes. Because both
clauses protect those who lack political recourse from being
burdened disproportionately by state action, the Commerce
Clause discrimination inquiry should be no less complete than
that applied in the equal protection context. Thus, the Wash-
ington Act's discriminatory application to the several types of
shareholders likely to be affected by its application must be
assessed.
2. The Act's Potential for Discrimination Against Two Types
of Shareholders
Because a target corporation's shareholders' interests are
not necessarily aligned, we consider the potential for discrimi-
nation with respect to two groups of shareholders-"disinter-
ested" shareholders who do not attain "acquiring person"
status under the Act33 and "interested" shareholders.
At least as applied to foreign corporations, target corpora-
tions subject to the Act must have a substantial number of in-
state shareholders. Thus, any deleterious effects of the Act on
disinterested shareholders will be borne by both in-state and
out-of-state parties, and the Act is nondiscriminatory as
applied to this class of shareholders.
The Act's effect on interested shareholders presents a
more difficult problem because of the possibility that the inter-
ested shareholders are more likely to be out-of-state parties.
Indeed, the enactment of the Washington Act in response to
the Pickens group's activities arguably illustrates the point.
This disproportionate effect hypothesis is set forth in an arti-
cle 34 which describes the circumstances under which Connecti-
cut's fair price antitakeover statute35 was passed. The author
asserts that state antitakeover legislation may result from the
perceived or potential threat of a hostile takeover to a large
corporation with a substantial in-state presence by an out-of-
state acquiror.3 Under the hypothesis, a politically powerful
in-state target may be expected to seek legislative protection
and face little opposition because the potential acquirors lack
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.50.020(1) (Supp. 1988).
34. Romano, infra note 36.
35. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374 (West 1987).
36. Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111
(1987).
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in-state political power and the target shareholders are geo-
graphically diffused and in many cases lack a sufficient eco-
nomic interest (absent collective shareholder action) to oppose
the proposed legislation. Thus, the interested or potentially
interested shareholders, subjected to the limits imposed by
state antitakeover statutes, may disproportionately be out-of-
state parties, and the political check that exists when legisla-
tion substantially affects in-state interests may be lacking.
The disproportionate effect hypothesis is flawed in at least
two ways. First, discrimination analysis under the Commerce
Clause does not mean that state legislatures must ignore
threats to local interests. That concern is not necessarily
improper discrimination in favor of local interests; it is an inev-
itable product of the federal system. The anti-discrimination
prong of Commerce Clause analysis instead requires that the
threat to local interests not be addressed only, or dispropor-
tionately, at the expense of nonresidents. Second, while the
population and economic base of any state assure that the pool
of potential acquiring parties is likely to be largely nonresi-
dent, that cannot itself be discrimination or a discriminatory
impact. The Supreme Court noted in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America 7 that it is not the number in each classifica-
tion that determines discrimination, but a difference in treat-
ment.3 " The Washington statute does not discriminate between
resident and non-resident acquiring parties. 9
Under a proper view of discrimination analysis, the Wash-
ington Act is suspect only if its purpose is simply to benefit
corporations incorporated or centered in Washington at the
expense of acquiring parties from outside the state. The pur-
poses of the Act, however, are stated not in terms of protecting
the covered companies because they are in Washington but
protecting the local economy against what is deemed to be a
37. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
38. Id. at 88.
39. In any event, a disproportionate impact should not, standing alone, establish
discrimination for Commerce Clause purposes. In a similar analysis of discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has found that discriminatory impact
alone will not generally rouse suspicion regarding legislative motivation. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). Thus, even if the Washington Act had
some disproportionate impact in practice, that fact would not necessarily suggest that
the Act is discriminatory. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
474 (1981) (upholding facially neutral statute even though the statute caused business




harmful business practice. Unless it could be shown that the
transactions prohibited under the Act are disfavored only
because they are engaged in by nonresidents at the expense of
residents, the Act should be treated as nondiscriminatory.
This approach comports with the discrimination analysis
under the Equal Protection Clause. 40 Here, as there, courts
have good reason to avoid direct examination of the motiva-
tions of the individual legislators.41 Instead, they focus on the
face of the statute, its stated purposes and such indirect tests as
whether the statute's means do not fit well with its stated pur-
poses, and instead fit much better with improper ends.42
The Washington Act fares well under this analysis. Its
purposes are facially proper. While factually and philosoph-
ically debatable, 43 reasonable legislators could conclude that
the types of transactions sought to be discouraged are economi-
cally and socially harmful. The Act is limited to a few foreign
corporations most important to the local economic and social
welfare, and it applies only to the most harmful post-acquisi-
tion activities. It does not preclude any acquisition at all, even
if by non-residents.
The Washington Act, could, under some circumstances, be
overinclusive in its application, for example, if it entailed the
sale of an asset located elsewhere. The combined definitions of
"target corporations" and "significant business transaction"
make this unlikely. Moreover, this kind of overinclusiveness-
protecting some other totality against the harmful transac-
tion- does not suggest non-resident discrimination. Even if it
did, the proper judicial remedy is to narrow the statute, not to
invalidate it on its face.
B. The Quantification Analysis
1. The Risk of Inconsistent Regulation
The extraterritorial scope of the Washington Act creates a
risk of inconsistent regulation of foreign corporations, and this
40. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
41. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971). But see Regan, The
Supreme Court and State Protectionism. Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce
C7ause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1143-60 (1986) (favoring motive review of state action
challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause).
42. See infra notes 46 & 56 and accompanying text.
43. See Note, Second Generation State Takeover Statutes and Shareholder Wealth.
An Empirical Study, 97 YALE L.J. 1193, 1231 (1988) (concluding that shareholders are
"generally harmed financially" by second generation antitakeover statutes).
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risk is the greatest threat to the constitutionality of the Act
under the Commerce Clause.
The majority opinion in CTS considered the risk that state
efforts to regulate corporate takeovers could impose inconsis-
tent regulations in violation of the Commerce Clause. The
majority concluded that the Indiana control share statute
posed no risk of inconsistent regulation because it applied only
to Indiana's domestic corporations. 44 The majority noted fur-
ther that no inconsistent regulation would occur so long as
each state limits the regulation of corporate shareholders' vot-
ing rights to its domestic corporations.45
Although the Washington Act applies to foreign corpora-
tions, that dissimilarity does not necessarily doom the statute
under CTS. CTS tells us only that the attributes of stock own-
ership may be determined by the state of incorporation; it does
not state that a moratorium by other states on particular types
of transactions that substantially affect those states would be
unconstitutional. One must therefore look to the risk of incon-
sistent regulation posed by the particular terms of the Wash-
ington Act.
The risk of inconsistent regulation is generally sufficient
to invalidate a state law only where an actual conflict with the
law of another state exists. A mere potential or hypothetical
conflict is not enough.46 The only potential conflict between
the Washington Act and the laws of other states would be the
conflict between more and less permissive business regulations.
The Act may prohibit certain transactions that other states,
perhaps even the state of incorporation, would allow. But in
this respect the Act is indistinguishable from state-imposed
health and safety regulations that are routinely upheld even
though they mandate different conduct by interstate busi-
nesses in different states. The fact that some states create
more or less beneficial environments in which to conduct busi-
ness does not violate the Commerce Clause.
State laws deemed unconstitutional because of inconsistent
regulation have generally mandated inconsistent affirmative
duties to act. For example, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Ari-
44. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88-89 (1987).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960)
(rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge where the plaintiff cited no regulation
inconsistent with the challenged ordinance).
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zona,47 the Supreme Court found that an Arizona statute regu-
lating train lengths unduly burdened interstate commerce
because of a perceived inconsistency between the Arizona reg-
ulation and other states' regulations and because of the Ari-
zona regulation's weakly articulated safety rationale. Similarly,
in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.," the Court held that it
was unconstitutional for Illinois to require that trucks travel-
ing on Illinois roads use contoured mud flaps. Forty-five states
allowed straight flaps and one state required them. Thus, the
Court concluded that Illinois' imposition of inconsistent regula-
tions on interstate commercial activity, coupled with the weak-
ness of Illinois' safety argument, rendered the requirement
unduly burdensome.49 Moreover, the identified weakness in
the safety rationales put forth in both Southern Paciftc and
Bibb suggests that the safety justifications were pretextual and
the enacting states' motives protectionist.
State laws may violate the Commerce Clause on inconsis-
tent regulation grounds even absent the imposition of inconsis-
tent affirmative duties if the cumulative effect of several state
laws would unduly burden interstate commerce."0 The Wash-
ington Act's scope is sufficiently narrow to substantially limit
the risk of this form of inconsistent regulation. The Act
applies only to those foreign corporations doing business in
Washington that have their principal executive offices in the
state and that have a substantial shareholder and employee
presence in Washington. In rejecting a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge, a recent California case cited the similarly narrow scope
of a California cumulative voting statute that applied to certain
47. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
48. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
49. TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987),
also illustrates the point. In TLX, the court concluded that an extraterritorial voting
rights statute, similar to the Indiana statute at issue in CTS, violated the Commerce
Clause because it posed a risk of inconsistent regulation. The court focused on the risk
of inconsistent affirmative duties to hold shareholder meetings to determine whether
voting rights would attach to a potential acquiror's shares. Id. at 1030-31.
50. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 6-12, at 434 (2d ed. 1988):
Even if nondiscriminatory and nonprotective when perceived in isolation,
regulatory measures applied by several states to the same multi-state business
may in the aggregate so operate against interstate commerce that, when
viewed in combination, they exert a potent localizing bias by making
commercial activities which are confined to a single state far less difficult and
more profitable than more national enterprises.
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foreign corporations.5
Generally, only one or two states will have sufficient ties
to a corporation to be inclined to extend antitakeover provi-
sions to the corporation. Although in some instances a state
with substantial ties and the state of incorporation might
impose different regulatory requirements on a given corpora-
tion, no inconsistent regulation would exist for Commerce
Clause purposes unless the corporation could not comply with
both requirements, or unless the combined effect of the regula-
tions was unduly burdensome. For example, consider a Dela-
ware corporation that qualifies as a "target corporation" under
the Washington Act. The Washington 2 and Delaware5 3 mora-
torium provisions both restrict certain types of transactions
between the target corporation and an interested shareholder.
The statutes differ, however, in that the Delaware law imposes
a higher threshold as to when a shareholder becomes inter-
ested and prohibits fewer types of transactions. The Delaware
law also provides several exceptions, such as supermajority
shareholder approval, that do not appear in the Washington
Act. Moreover, Washington's moratorium is imposed for five
years, whereas Delaware's is imposed for only three years.
Despite these differences, a target corporation would be
fully able to comply with both legislative schemes by
refraining from engaging in the transactions prohibited by
Washington during the more restrictive five-year period. The
interested shareholders' inability to take advantage of the
exceptions to the moratorium provided by Delaware law no
more imposes inconsistent burdens for Commerce Clause pur-
poses than if Washington imposed stricter waste disposal
requirements than did Delaware.'
51. Wilson v. Louisiana-Paci~fc Resources, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 226-27, 187
Cal. Rptr. 852, 860 (1982).
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.50.010 (Supp. 1988).
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988).
54. But see Hyde Park Partners L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 844 (1st Cir. 1988)
(stating in dictum that extraterritorial application of the antitakeover statute would
not likely survive a Commerce Clause challenge because of the risk of inconsistent
regulation); TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987)
(granting preliminary injunction against enforcement of an Oklahoma extraterritorial
antitakeover statute). As we noted, supra at note 48, the statute at issue in TLX,
unlike the Washington Act, posed the risk that inconsistent affirmative duties would
be placed upon foreign corporations subject to the statute's limitations. Moreover,
because the Washington Act requires a more substantial nexus between the state and
the foreign corporations subject to the Act's terms than does the Oklahoma statute,
compare WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.50.020 (13)(b) (Supp. 1988) with OKLA. STAT. tit. 18,
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2. The Balancing of State and Federal Interests
In a substantial number of cases prior to CTS, the
Supreme Court attempted to quantify the burden placed upon
interstate commerce through a balancing test. In Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., the Court formulated the inquiry as follows:
Generally, where the statute regulates evenhandedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld. A
statute may, however, be constitutionally suspect if the bur-
den imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the statute's putative local benefits. If a legiti-
mate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree. Moreover, the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with
a lesser impact on interstate activities.56
In conducting this balancing test, the Court has considered
such factors as whether the subject matter of the regulation is
one of traditional state concern,5 7 whether the means used to
advance the state's objective is the least intrusive available, 8
and whether the benefits of the statute outweigh the burden
on interstate commerce. 59 Because of the "infinite variety" of
cases in which local regulation may affect interstate com-
merce,6 ° the inquiry is necessarily fact intensive.6' Moreover,
its principal focus is the practical effect of the legislation, and
the state law will be judged chiefly by its probable effects.2
The Washington Act withstands Commerce Clause scru-
tiny under this balancing test. That corporate governance and
the regulation of the economic effects of comparable behavior
§ 1148 (West Supp. 1989), the Washington Act poses a lesser threat of inconsistent
regulation than did the Oklahoma statute.
55. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
56. Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
57. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981).
58. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 146-47 (1986); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1951).
59. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
350-52 (1977).
60. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (1945).
61. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (particularized inquiry
focusing on financial impact of regulation on one interstate business).
62. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 37 (1980).
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are areas of traditional state concern is not open to question.6 3
The means employed by the Act to accomplish the law's goals
are limited in a number of ways. The Act preserves the fiscal
integrity of corporations with substantial ties to Washington by
imposing temporal restrictions on a limited number of business
transactions in order to deter the destructive breaking up of
acquired corporations by corporate raiders. It does not discour-
age all hostile takeovers, nor does it regulate the tender offer
process. It does not interfere with shareholders' voting rights,
nor with takeovers deemed by the target's board to be in the
corporation's best interest.
In addition, the benefits to Washington in enforcing the
Act outweigh any incidental burden imposed by the Act on
interstate commerce. Washington's interest in the Act is two-
fold. First, the Act protects the state against the social and
economic consequences of the dissipation of the assets of large
corporations with substantial connections to the state. Second,
it protects resident shareholders and employees. The "signifi-
cant business transactions" limited by the Act dissipate assets
because a shareholder seeking control may use the assets to
finance a takeover, potentially resulting in a distress sale of
assets, and because the takeover attempt itself diverts manage-
ment's attention and corporate resources. Washington's pur-
pose is thus not to protect in-state interests from interstate
competition, which is the primary evil sought to be remedied
by the Commerce Clause.' Instead, the Act preserves the
financial resources of corporations critical to the state's econ-
omy so as to allow them to compete more effectively. The Act
thus promotes rather than conflicts with the free trade values
underlying the Commerce Clause. Further, because it regu-
lates business transactions to prevent harm to in-state resi-
dents and employees, the Act is like any other non-
exclusionary exercise of the state's police and regulatory power
over business. It is thus analogous to the regulation of profes-
sional conduct,65 the imposition of environmental and safety
restrictions," and the nondiscriminatory taxation of
63. See Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
64. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951).
65. See Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1086
(1986).




Because of its preservationist goals, the Act is also analo-
gous to state actions upheld in decisions dealing with the pres-
ervation of natural resources. State laws regulating natural
resources violate the Commerce Clause principally when such
laws are exclusionary rather than preservationist.6" In Cities
Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co.,69 the Supreme Court
upheld a Texas arrangement whereby a state commission fixed
the minimum wellhead price for natural gas, noting that "[a]
state is justifiably concerned with preventing rapid and uneco-
nomic dissipation of one of its chief natural resources. '7 ° It
further noted that, although the federal interest was strong,
there was no clear harm to that interest in the state regula-
tion.71 Similarly, Washington has a strong interest in prevent-
ing the dissipation of the assets of corporations with
substantial ties to the state, and the Act neither conflicts with
nor harms any federal interest.
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the nondis-
criminatory regulation of business conduct when the state's
action could be justified by a rationale other than resident
favoritism and the regulation had a minimal effect on inter-
state commerce. In rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to
a fee imposed by a state on a public utility, the Court stated in
Great Northern Railway v. Washington72 that "[t]he supervi-
sion and regulation of the local structures and activities of a
corporation engaged in interstate commerce.. . is not a burden
upon, or regulation of, interstate commerce in violation of the
commerce clause."73 In Parker v. Brown,74 the Court upheld a
California legislative scheme regulating the marketing of rai-
sins in order to maintain and stabilize prices despite the
scheme's substantial impact on interstate commerce (95% of
the state's raisin production entered interstate commerce) and
its potential conflict with the policies underlying the federal
antitrust laws. Similarly, numerous cases have upheld nondis-
criminatory state or local taxation of business conduct despite
67. See Mackay Tel. & Cable Co. v. City of Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94, 99 (1919).
68. See, e.g., Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (invalidating
requirement of in-state processing of locally caught fish).
69. 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
70. Id. at 187.
71. Id.
72. 300 U.S. 154 (1937).
73. Id. at 160 (footnote omitted).
74. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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the obvious impact of such taxes on interstate commerce.7 5
The justification of the Indiana statute upheld by the
Supreme Court in CTS was similar to that of the Washington
Act-the protection of shareholders from what the state legis-
lature perceived to be the harms incident to hostile take-
overs."6 The CTS majority opinion noted that by regulating the
corporate governance of large corporations states necessarily
affect interstate commerce incidentally, but that such regula-
tion is "an accepted part of the business landscape."77 More-
over, it rejected the argument that, because tender offers
might actually benefit shareholders, the state had no interest
in limiting them in order to protect shareholders. After noting
the debate over the economic effect of tender offers, the Court
stated that it was "not inclined 'to second-guess the empirical
judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of legisla-
tion.' "78 Nor would the Court consider the likely effectiveness
of the state legislation in achieving its goals.79
The Washington Act's extension to a limited group of for-
eign corporations does not alter the outcome of the CTS analy-
sis. In holding Illinois' antitakeover statute unconstitutional in
Edgar v. MITE Corp., ° the Supreme Court relied in part upon
the fact that the statute would extend to transactions entirely
between out-of-state buyers and sellers.8 ' The limitation of the
Washington Act's scope to corporations with a substantial
number of Washington resident shareholders or employees
reduces this concern. Moreover, the majority in CTS declined
to apply the Edgar v. MITE Corp. analysis because the Indiana
75. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980)
(upholding apportioned tax of New York corporation by Vermont). See also Container
Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (upholding California's
method of taxing corporate taxpayer with foreign subsidiaries).
76. Whether the view that hostile takeovers are harmful to the disinterested
shareholders is correct and whether such harm has been empirically demonstrated
does not control the state laws' constitutionality. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 481 U.S. 69, 96-97 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("a law can be both economic
folly and constitutional").
77. Id. at 91. Although CTS concerned regulation by the chartering state, in the
absence of the risk of inconsistent regulation (see supra note 43-53 and accompanying
text) the extension of such regulation to a narrowly drawn class of foreign
corporations should not change the outcome of the Commerce Clause inquiry.
78. Id. at 92 (quoting Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679 (1981),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)).
79. Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 188 (1950).
80. 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
81. The Illinois statute at issue purported to supplement the Williams Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), 78n(d)-(f), by directly regulating the tender offer process.
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statute being reviewed applied only to domestic corporations
with a substantial number of shares held by Indiana residents:
"every application of the Indiana Act will affect a substantial
number of Indiana residents, whom Indiana indisputably has
an interest in protecting." 2 Although it extends to a limited
class of foreign corporations, the same is true of the Washing-
ton Act.
The balancing of state and federal interests does not
require that the state interest be weighed against the federal
interest in unburdened commerce. Rather, the inquiry should
address whether the state has a legitimate interest of sufficient
import that any incidental effect on commerce should be
accommodated. Thus, the federal side of the balance should
focus on the extent of the hindrance of commerce rather than
the relative importance of the policies underlying the Com-
merce Clause and the state regulation.
If the Washington Act burdens interstate commerce, it
does so by making hostile takeovers of corporations subject to
the Act's limitations less attractive if the potential acquiror
would prefer to finance the acquisition over the short term
with the target's assets. Similarly, the Indiana statute upheld
in CTS was said to make acquisition of a subject corporation's
shares less attractive because it made the attachment of voting
rights to the acquiror's shares contingent upon the approval of
a majority of the disinterested shareholders. The CTS majority
noted that all states have enacted corporate governance laws
that affect interstate commerce by influencing the desirability
of certain corporate transactions.8 3 It cited the examples of
supermajority voting requirements for merger approvals and
various "dissenters' rights" provisions."4 Because of the states'
interests in promoting stable corporate relationships and in
protecting resident shareholders, corporate governance regula-
tions survive despite their effect on interstate commerce.
Although the CTS majority refers to the state's interest in
regulating corporations that it charters, its arguments apply
with equal force to state regulations that extend to those for-
eign corporations with substantial ties to the regulating state.
As the taxation and natural resource cases show, the even-
handed regulation of foreign corporations doing business in a
82. CTS, 481 U.S. at 93.
83. Id. at 89-90.
84. Id.
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state is permissible under the Commerce Clause. There is
nothing peculiar to Washington's regulation of particular
transactions that mandates a different analysis. Absent a con-
trary showing, the place of organization or chartering of a mar-
ket participant is not relevant to the appraisal and
accommodation of the competing demands of the state and
national interests that the Commerce Clause inquiry is
intended to achieve.
C. The Act's Consistency With the Commerce Clause's
Non-Protectionist Goals
Although the Commerce Clause case law has a "plainly
manipulable and at times anachronistically metaphysical char-
acter,""5 the Clause's purpose provides a governing principle
that both explains the jurisprudence and favors rejection of a
Commerce Clause challenge to the Washington Act. Absent
substantial interference with free trade or mere favoritism of
residents over nonresidents, such as the protection of in-state
producers from out-of-state competition, 6 the prevention of
the flow of goods oi. t of the state until the in-state demand has
been satisfied, v or the requirement of in-state processing of
natural resources, 88 state legislation should withstand dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny. 9 Thus, the "crucial inquiry" is
whether the Act "is basically a protectionist measure, or
whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate
local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are
only incidental."9 °
"Protectionism" for Commerce Clause purposes refers
to attempts by a state to place itself in economic isolation. 91
The concern with protectionism reflects "a central concern
85. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-14, at 440 (2d ed. 1988).
86. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
87. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
88. See, e.g., Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
89. Federalism concerns also favor the exercise of judicial restraint in this context.
The dormant Commerce Clause inquiry entails the review of state legislation in areas
where Congress has chosen not to act. Although some have inferred from this that
judicial review consequently should be especially vigorous, see, e.g., Brown, The Open
Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219,
220-21 (1957), we conclude that when Congress has chosen not to regulate a given area
of commerce the courts should not be quick to displace the states' regulatory scheme.
90. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). See generally THE
FEDERALIST NoS. 41, 42 (Madison). See also Monaghan, Forward: Constitutional
Common Law: The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-17 (1975).
91. H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 537-38.
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of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the
Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to
succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies
toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations
among the Colonies and later among the States under the
Articles of Confederation." 92
However, the Washington Act is not protectionist or exclu-
sionary in its purposes or in its effects. Its purposes are to pro-
mote the financial stability of corporations with substantial ties
to the state and to protect the state's resident shareholders and
employees. To the extent that the Act protects either subject
corporations or shareholders, that protection is from predatory
conduct in the marketplace, regardless of its geographic origin,
and not from out-of-state competition with in-state companies,
shareholders, or acquiring parties. By preserving corporate
assets and protecting participants in the capital markets, the
Act in fact promotes the free trade which the Commerce
Clause was intended to protect.
III. THE WASHINGTON ACT'S CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE
The Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution pro-
vides for federal preemption of state law under some circum-
stances.9 3 Preemption occurs
when Congress expresses a clear intent to preempt state law,
when there is outright or actual conflict between federal and
state law, where compliance with both federal and state law
is in effect physically impossible, where there is implicit in
federal law a barrier to state regulation, where Congress has
legislated comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of
regulation and leaving no room for the States to supplement
federal law, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of
Congress.
94
No federal statute exclusively regulates the transactions
subject to the Washington Act, and compliance with both fed-
92. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). See also R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK
& J. YOUNG, supra note 23, at § 4.3 (summarizing the history of the Commerce
Clause).
93. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
94. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986) (citations
omitted).
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eral and Washington law is possible. The only possible pre-
emption rationale is that the Washington Act might hinder
accomplishment of the objectives of the federal securities
laws.95 For example, other state antitakeover statutes have
been challenged as conflicting with the federal Williams Act,'
which regulates the tender offer process by (1) requiring an
informational filing by offerors and (2) stating procedural rules
that the offeror must follow.
In CTS, the Supreme Court addressed the preemptive
effect of the Williams Act as applied to Indiana's control share
statute.97 The Indiana statute requires approval by noninter-
ested shareholders before a person holding a control block of
an Indiana corporation's shares will be entitled to voting
rights. After analyzing both the Williams Act's regulatory
scheme and Congress' goals in enacting it, the Court concluded
that the Indiana law was not preempted by the Williams Act.9"
Prior to CTS, a plurality of the Supreme Court in Edgar v.
MITE Corp.,99 and several lower courts, 100 had concluded that
the Williams Act was meant to strike a balance in the battle
between target management and a hostile tender offeror, and
that state regulation must not upset that balance. The major-
ity opinion in CTS focused, however, not on this balance of
power, but on the Indiana statute's affording of protection to
corporate shareholders from both the offeror and the incum-
bent management.' 0 ' It concluded that this protection fur-
thered a basic purpose of the Williams Act-to place investors
and offerors on an equal footing in the tender offer process.
10 2
The Washington Act is valid under CTS's preemption anal-
ysis. Like the control share statute at issue in CTS, the Wash-
ington Act does not regulate or affect the tender offer process.
It takes effect only after a successful tender offer and limits
for five years "significant business transactions" between the
target corporation and certain shareholders under certain cir-
95. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
97. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78-87 (1987).
98. Id. at 86-87.
99. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
100. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 261 (7th Cir.
1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558,
565-66 (6th Cir. 1982).
101. CTS, 481 U.S. at 80-82.
102. Id. at 82.
[Vol. 13:41
Washington's Antitakeover Act
cumstances.10 3 Thus, the Act is unrelated to the disclosure
requirements, the timing of offers, or any other procedural
aspect of the tender offer process regulated by the Williams
Act.
That the Washington Act may make certain corporations
with substantial connections to Washington less attractive to
some potential tender offerors is not sufficient to show pre-
emption. This impact is much like the possibility that the Indi-
ana statute might delay some tender offers. The majority in
CTS acknowledged that the practical effect of this requirement
could be to condition acquisition of control on the approval of a
majority of the noninterested shareholders, but nonetheless
found this effect insufficient to require preemption."° As with
a state's health and safety regulation of business conduct, the
Washington Act might make a Washington-based business less
attractive to a prospective purchaser, but that result does not
favor a finding of federal preemption.10 5 The Act's effect on
the attractiveness of a potential takeover target implicates the
policies underlying the Williams Act less than the myriad valid
state corporate laws that affect the attractiveness of a company
as an acquisition. °6 Thus, companies headquartered or incorpo-
rated in states with high tax rates, strict environmental laws,
onerous employment or plant closing statutes and the like
might be less attractive than they would otherwise be to an
acquiror, but federal regulation of the interstate commerce in
corporate acquisitions does not preempt such laws.
Likewise, the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Edgar
v. MITE Corp.07 does not favor preemption of the Washington
Act.0 8 MITE held unconstitutional an Illinois antitakeover
statute that included a twenty-day precommencement notifica-
103. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
104. CTS, 481 U.S. at 84.
105. The courts have historically upheld state police power regulation unless
compliance with both state and federal law is not merely burdensome but impossible.
See, e.g., California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581 (1987);
California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987); Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 218 (1985) (state law must "inevitably" frustrate federal
law).
106. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 708 (West Supp. 1987) (affording shareholders
the right to cumulative voting).
107. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
108. As the majority opinion in CTS explains, Justice White's plurality opinion in
MITE was joined by only two other justices in its treatment of the preemption issue.
CTS, 481 U.S. at 81. Consequently, that opinion "cannot stand for a broad preemption
principle under which any state regulation of tender offers would have to be
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tion requirement for tender offers, a hearing provision with no
time deadline, and a fairness provision allowing a state official
to enjoin tender offers he or she deemed to be substantively
unfair. The plurality found that the precommencement notice
and hearing requirements conflicted with the Williams Act by
permitting management-created delays of tender offers. It also
concluded that, in contravention of the Williams Act, the fair-
ness assessment displaced the investors' decision-making pow-
ers. The Washington Act, however, does not tamper with the
notification or any other procedural requirement of the Wil-
liams Act. Its only possible effect on tender offers is its poten-
tial for making them less attractive on the merits to certain
potential acquirors. Thus, the MITE plurality opinion presents
no bar to rejecting a Williams Act preemption argument.
Preemption of state law is not to be presumed lightly.' °9
Moreover, the interstitial nature of federal law must be consid-
ered in the preemption analysis. Professor Gunther's preemp-
tion discussion states that federal legislation on the whole
has been conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accom-
plish limited objectives. It builds upon legal relationships
established by the states, altering or supplanting them only
so far as is necessary for the special purpose. Congress acts,
in short, against the background of the total corpus juris of
the states in much the way that a state legislature acts
against the background of the common law, assumed to gov-
ern unless changed by legislation.110
When it enacted the Williams Act, Congress can be pre-
sumed to have been aware that it was regulating in an area of
long-standing state dominance. If it had meant to preempt all
state law with even indirect effects on tender offers, it would
presumably have done so explicitly."1 Instead, it chose to reg-
ulate the disclosure of information by the offeror and the pro-
cedural aspects of the offer. The Supreme Court has
recognized a strong presumption against implied preemption of
historic state regulation, particularly where Congress has acted
invalidated." Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1036 (1st Cir. 1982)
(upholding the Massachusetts antitakeover statute after MITE).
109. New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973);
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d at 1038.
110. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 344 (1980)
(quoting H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
§ 435 (1953)).
111. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 86.
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after the states and without expressly limiting the states'
efforts.
112
Moreover, the federal securities laws expressly preserve
state regulation of corporate behavior." 3 The courts are justi-
fiably hesitant to find implied preemption where Congress has
explicitly allowed both federal and state regulation. 11 4 When
dual regulation has been explicitly allowed, there is no pre-
emption absent Congress' "clear and manifest purpose.""' 5
Neither logic nor precedent support the conclusion that Con-
gress intended the Williams Act to preempt the type of eco-
nomic and public welfare regulation contained in the
Washington Act.116
112. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 109 S.Ct. 1661, 1665 (1989); Puerto Rico Dep't of
Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1350, 1353 (1988); Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985); Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1963).
113. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (Supp. V 1987).
114. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 370 (1986).
115. Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 108 S. Ct. at
1353.
116. Another aspect of the Washington Act-the prohibition, under certain
circumstances, of the discharge of five percent or more of a covered corporation's
employees-might be preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), or the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1982). However, both of these
federal acts only provide procedural frameworks in which labor and management
operate and neither, outside of ERISA's treatment of pension plans, regulates
substantive conduct.
Congress has not occupied the entire field of labor legislation, Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985), and the preemptive effect of federal labor law
turns on the extent to which Congress has implicitly limited the permissible scope of
state regulation of the labor-management relationship. New York Tel. Co. v. New
York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 527 (1979). Thus, the purpose and scope of the
federal legislation is again the starting point for the preemption analysis.
ERISA regulates employee benefit and pension plans. Its function in the area of
benefits is largely procedural; it does not mandate that employers provide any
particular benefits. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1983). In enacting
ERISA, Congress intended to promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in benefit plans. Id. at 90. The Supreme Court recently upheld the
constitutionality of a state law analogous to the Washington Act because it was
designed to protect employees from the economic consequences of certain business
decisions. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987). Fort Halifax
concerned a Maine statute that imposed a one-time severance pay requirement on
employers in the event of a plant closing. The Court found that the statute neither
established nor required the employer to maintain an employee welfare "plan" as
contemplated by ERISA, and that the state statute consequently was not preempted.
The Washington Act's employment provision also does not establish or require the
maintenance of an employee benefit plan. Like the Maine statute, it merely regulates
employer conduct. Thus, ERISA does not preempt the Act's employment provision.
The NLRA provides "a framework for self-organization and collective
bargaining." Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 751
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite its extraterritorial reach, the Washington Act
withstands both the discrimination and quantification inquiries
of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause analysis. The Act's
stated purposes and probable effects are nondiscriminatory.
Even if potential acquiring parties are disproportionally non-
resident, such disproportionality would not, standing alone,
warrant a finding that the Act is unconstitutional. Further,
the Act poses neither a risk of inconsistent affirmative duties
nor a risk of unduly burdensome conflicting regulations. Per-
haps most importantly, the Act's purpose is consistent with the
Commerce Clause's underlying free trade values.
The Washington Act should also withstand a Supremacy
Clause challenge. The Act neither attempts to regulate in an
area fully preempted by Congress, nor threatens to hinder the
accomplishment of the objectives of any federal legislative or
regulatory scheme. Like the Indiana statute upheld by the
Supreme Court in CTS, the Act does no more than potentially
make some acquisitions less attractive. Such an effect is insuf-
ficient to render the Act preempted by the Williams Act or any
other federal laws governing the securities markets.
(1985). Like ERISA, the NLRA does not substantively regulate the relationship
between the employer and employee. It is "concerned primarily with establishing an
equitable process and determining terms and conditions of employment, and not with
particular substantive terms of the bargain that is struck when the parties are
negotiating from relatively equal positions." Id. at 753.
Under both Fort Halifax and Metropolitan Life, a state may create and alter the
substantive rights of employees, in effect establishing a base line from which collective
bargaining over a matter may be conducted, without conflicting with the NLRA. In
Metropolitan Life, the Court allowed a state to establish minimum health insurance
benefits. In Fort Halifax, it allowed a state to impose a minimum amount of severance
pay in the event of a plant closure. The Act's employment provision similarly provides
a base line from which collective bargaining may be conducted. The provision is thus
analytically indistinguishable from those at issue in Metropolitan Life and Fort
Halifax. Because Washington does not attempt to regulate the bargaining process
itself, but merely exercises its police power by imposing certain minimum
requirements on some employers, the NLRA does not preempt the Act's employment
provision.
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